此獨占廠商在追求利潤極大化下的生產量為55 萬
此獨占廠商在追求利潤極大化下的生產量為60 萬
若政府向此廠商課徵500 萬元的定額稅,其稅後利潤為$2250 萬元
若政府向此廠商課徵500 萬元的定額稅,其稅後利潤為$2000 萬元
承續上題,若此獨占廠商可鑑別每個消費者的消費情形而採行第一級差別定價,
則下列何者為真?
其社會福利水準會低於完全競爭時的社會福利水準
消費者剩餘為1000 萬元
社會總福利為5000 萬元
社會總福利為4000 萬元
無解
最近媒體報導一家印刷工廠的經理因表現優異,老闆送給他的年終獎金是一輛賓
士轎車和100 萬元現金。他接受採訪表示,自己雖在傳統產業工作,但每天要花
三小時學習新技術,他印刷書籍的主要原料投入為無毒碳粉(E)和再生紙(F)。
假設每印一套書籍平均要消耗三單位的無毒碳粉和五單位的再生紙,且缺一不
可。則下列何者為真?
若這個月決定印裝100 份書籍,則無毒碳粉和再生紙的消耗量分別為500 和
300 單位
若這個月決定印裝100 份書籍,則無毒碳粉和再生紙的消耗量分別為300 和
500 單位
Consider the following game describing the situation of two firms which are
considering building a new plant.
(The numbers in each pair are firm 1's payoff and firm 2's payoff respectively).
Both firms have a dominant strategy.
Only one firm has a dominant strategy.
(not build, not build) is a Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium does not maximize the firms’ joint profit.
There are gains from trade.
Both Anna and Claire are made better off than their original endowment when the
market is in competitive equilibrium.
More than 50 licenses are approved when the market is perfectly competitive.
The total number of tuna caught increases when the marginal cost decreases in the
competitive equilibria.
Suppose tuna fishing at Oma is taken by the fishermen’s co-op, which pays a
fisherman 500000 yen for the season and sell all the tuna caught at the market price
of 50000 yen per tuna. The co-op then hires less than 50 fishermen if it wants to
maximize its profits.
Instead of taking over tuna fishing, the co-op can achieve the efficient outcome by
requiring the local council to increase the fishng lishing license fee.
Her expected wealth is greater than 180 if she has no insurance.
Her expected utility is greater than 13 if she has no insurance.
She will purchase only one policy so as to maximize her expected utility.
She will purchase both policy X and Y so as to maximize her expected utility.
Which of the following statements about an individual consumer’s demand is true?
Briefly give reasons for your answer.
The own-price substitution effect will be negative if the consumer’s indifference
curves are convex to the origin.
The ordinary demand for good X must be decreasing in the price of good X.
The compensated demand curves are always downward sloping curves.
The endowment income effect of normal good X cannot be negative when the price
of good X increases.
The Cournot equilibrium output for each firm is 20 units.
The Cournot equilibrium price of the new cleaner is $40 per units.
The maximized profit for Ace Company is $900.
The maximized profit for Ace Company is $800.
The optimal peak-load price is $12.08.
The optimal non-peak-load price is $3.83.
By switching for a uniform price to peak-load pricing, the sum of consumer and
producer surplus is increased.
By switching for a uniform price to peak-load pricing, the sum of consumer and
producer surplus is unchanged.
Given 4 units of rental equipment used in the short run, the company will hire 225
workers per day to produce 30 cameras daily. Its short-run cost is $700 per day.
Given 4 units of rental equipment used in the short run, the company will hire 200
workers per day to produce 30 cameras daily. Its short-run cost is $723 per day.
In the long run, the company will adjust its capital capacity by using 15 units of
rental equipment to minimize its production cost of producing 30 units of cameras
daily.
In the long run, the company will adjust its capital capacity by using 10 units of
rental equipment to minimize its production cost of producing 30 units of cameras
daily.
Point “a” in the above figure denotes Bertrand equilibrium.
Point “b” in the above figure denotes Cournot equilibrium.
Point “b” in the above figure denotes Stackelberg equilibrium.
Point “a” in the above figure denotes Cournot equilibrium.
Which of the following statements on asymmetric information are (or is) true?
Equilibrium in a market involving hidden action typically involves some form of
rationing-firms would like to provide more than they do, but they are unwilling to
do so since it will change the incentives of their customers.
Signaling refers to the fact that when adverse selection or moral hazard are present,
some agents will want to invest in signals that will differentiate them from other
agents. Investment in signals is privately and publically beneficial.
Signaling refers to the fact that when adverse selection or moral hazard are present,
some agents will want to invest in signals that will differentiate them from other
agents. Investment in signals may be privately beneficial but publically wasteful.
Equilibrium in a market involving hidden information will typically involve too
little trade taking place because of the externality between the “good” and “bad”
types.
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