自由時報2008 年12 月10 日報導,「由於海烏魚子日漸稀少,目前市面上以養殖
烏魚子為大宗,但今年因養殖烏魚子約減產3 成,導致每兩平均價格上漲1、2
百元,目前一副6 兩重的養殖烏魚子叫價1600 元、8 兩重1800 元。」根據此報
導,下列何者敘述必定為真?
(註:蘇福男,「減產3 成烏魚子價漲,民眾捨不得購買」,自由時報,2008 年12 月10)
8 兩重的養殖烏魚子的需求彈性大於2。
6 兩重的養殖烏魚子的需求彈性不會大於4。
8 兩重的養殖烏魚子的供給彈性大於2。
6 兩重的養殖烏魚子的供給彈性不會大於4。
以上皆非。
自由時報2008 年12 月10 日報導,「由於海烏魚子日漸稀少,目前市面上以養殖
烏魚子為大宗,但今年因養殖烏魚子約減產3 成,導致每兩平均價格上漲1、2
百元,目前一副6 兩重的養殖烏魚子叫價1600 元、8 兩重1800 元。」
以上報導提及,「雖然今年萬物皆漲,海烏魚子照理也應調漲,但考量
當前景氣低迷,業者都不敢貿然漲價,目前一副7 兩重的海烏魚子約2400 元,
買氣仍欲振乏力。」根據此段報導,海烏魚子市場今年跟去年相比:
(註:蘇福男,「減產3 成烏魚子價漲,民眾捨不得購買」,自由時報,2008 年12 月10)
供給曲線右移
需求曲線左移
均衡價格不變
均衡數量不變
以上皆非。
考慮下面這個賽局:L 先生和N 先生打網球,由L 先生發球,N 先生接發球。L
先生可以選擇發正手方或反手方,N 先生可選擇準備接正手方或反手方,雙方同
時選擇。如果L 先生發正手方,N 先生也準備接正手方,那L 先生得分的機率是
50%,如果N 先生準備接的是反手方,那L 先生得分的機率是70%。如果L 先
生發反手方,N 先生也準備接反手方,那L 先生得分的機率是60%,如果N 先
生準備接的是正手方,那L 先生得分的機率是80%。在這個賽局的均衡中,下列
敘述何者必定為真:
這個賽局有兩個Nash 均衡。
L 先生的均衡混合策略中,發正手方與發反手方的機率相同。
N 先生的均衡混合策略中,接正手方與接反手方的機率相同。
N 先生的接發球得分率為35%。
L 先生不論發哪一個方向,他的發球得分率都一樣。
根據2009 年1 月22 日蘋果日報的新聞,盧彥勳在打敗世界排名11 的
納班迪恩之後,接受採訪指出,「納班迪恩是反手拍比較強的球員。」因此,如
果我們要描述「盧彥勳發球、納班迪恩接發球」的賽局,比較合乎現實的得失分
機率為:如果盧彥勳發正手方,納班迪恩也準備接正手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率
是p,如果納班迪恩準備接的是反手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是q,且q > p 。
如果盧彥勳發反手方,納班迪恩也準備接反手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是
( p − 0.1),如果納班迪恩準備接的是正手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是(q − 0.1)。
根據ATP 網站的資料,盧彥勳本場實際的發球得分率為64%。假設納班迪恩押
對接球方向的時候比押錯方向的時候接發球得分率多18%。下列敘述何者為真:
(詹健全,「盧彥勳晉大滿貫男單32 強 台灣第1 人爆冷拍落世界第11 告慰父親」,蘋果日
報,2009 年1 月22 日。)
p + q =1.38
盧彥勳的均衡混合策略中,發正手方與發反手方的機率相同。
在這個賽局的混合策略均衡中,納班迪恩知道盧彥勳發正手方與發反手方的
機率相同。
納班迪恩的均衡混合策略中,選擇接正手方的機率小於75%。
納班迪恩不論預備接哪一方,他的接發球得分率都一樣。
根據2009 年1 月22 日蘋果日報的新聞,盧彥勳在打敗世界排名11 的
納班迪恩之後,接受採訪指出,「納班迪恩是反手拍比較強的球員。」2因此,如
果我們要描述「盧彥勳發球、納班迪恩接發球」的賽局,比較合乎現實的得失分
機率為:如果盧彥勳發正手方,納班迪恩也準備接正手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率
是p,如果納班迪恩準備接的是反手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是q,且q > p 。
如果盧彥勳發反手方,納班迪恩也準備接反手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是
( p − 0.1),如果納班迪恩準備接的是正手方,那盧彥勳得分的機率是(q − 0.1)。
根據ATP 網站的資料,盧彥勳本場實際的發球得分率為64%。假設納班迪恩押
對接球方向的時候比押錯方向的時候接發球得分率多18%。
盧彥勳最後獲勝的關鍵在於『盧在最後1 局改變策略
說:「納班是反手拍很強的球員,所以,他總以為我會發正手拍,結果我在被破
發點出現時都發在他的反手拍,6 次被破發點都被我拿下。」』下列敘述何者為
真:
在這個賽局中,納班迪恩明知盧彥勳發正手方與發反手方的機率相同,但是
他選擇正手方的機率大於50%。
即使我們不假設納班迪恩押對比押錯方向的時候接發球得分率差多少,只要
知道盧彥勳本場實際的發球得分率,我們就可以算出p + q 是多少。
即使我們不曉得盧彥勳本場實際的發球得分率,也不假設納班迪恩押對比押
錯方向的時候接發球得分率差多少,我們還是可以知道盧彥勳選擇發正手方
與發反手方的機率。
如果納班迪恩知道盧彥勳「在被破發點出現時都發在他的反手拍」,那他應該
採取的策略是「總是接反手方」。
如果納班迪恩只知道「盧在最後1 局改變策略」、以致反手方發得稍微多一點
(和均衡策略相比),那他應該採取的策略是「總是接反手方」。
考慮以下事實:
請問下列何者為真?
Dash 8-300 每飛行一英哩所需耗費的油料成本高於110 元。
立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程的油料成本高於15,000 元。
立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程,油料以外的成本低於20,000 元。
立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程的總成本高於37,000 元。
以載客率六成計算,立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程的每人平均成本大於
1080 元。
考慮以下事實:
根據台灣中油公司網站資料顯示,2009 年1 月1 日航空燃油價格降為每
公升16.09 元。請問下列何者為真:
以新油價計算,Dash 8-300 每飛行一英哩所需耗費的油料成本低於50 元。
以新油價計算,立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程所需耗費的油料成本低於
7000 元。
假設其他成本不變,立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程的總成本低於28,700
元。
以載客率六成計算,立榮航空飛行台北-馬祖航線單程的每人平均成本低於
840 元。
單程票價目前為1,962 元,則載客率六成時,每載一人的利潤,2009 年1 月
較2008 年7 月要高至少240 元。
考慮以下事實:
下列何者必定為真:
Dash 8-300 每公升燃油可以飛行0.306 英哩。
當班機客滿時,多載一人的邊際成本,以2008 年7 月份油價計算為1100.3 元。
當班機客滿時,少載一人的邊際成本,以2008 年7 月份油價計算為1100.3 元。
當班機尚未客滿,多載一人的邊際成本,以2009 年1 月份油價計算則為855.6
元。
立榮航空公司在油價下跌之後,必然會調降價格。
There are two types of special kidney donation used in the US: Kidney swaps and
kidney chains. According to Wall Street Journal (“A Daisy Chain of Kidney Donations” by
Ronda L. Rundle, 9/23/2008), a kidney swap “occurs between two or more sets of
incompatible recipients and donors, who are usually family members. If a donor’s organ
isn’t compatible with a loved one who needs a kidney, doctors are able to swap that organ
with one from another incompatible pair.”
Moreover, a kidney chain “starts with an altruistic individual who wants to donate a
kidney to help a stranger in need. The anonymous donation goes to a recipient who has
lined up a living donor, but who isn’t biologically compatible. In turn, that donor’s kidney
can benefit other patients who have also lined up living donors who ended up being
incompatible, each time passing an extra kidney down the line.”
Order the following by efficiency: A society that
Allows kidney swap,
Allows kidney chain,
Allows any voluntary donations with no monetary compensation,
Allows voluntary donations only between close relatives,
Allows kidney sales but has price control at price p > 0 .
There are two types of special kidney donation used in the US: Kidney swaps and
kidney chains. According to Wall Street Journal (“A Daisy Chain of Kidney Donations” by
Ronda L. Rundle, 9/23/2008), a kidney swap “occurs between two or more sets of
incompatible recipients and donors, who are usually family members. If a donor’s organ
isn’t compatible with a loved one who needs a kidney, doctors are able to swap that organ
with one from another incompatible pair.”
Moreover, a kidney chain “starts with an altruistic individual who wants to donate a
kidney to help a stranger in need. The anonymous donation goes to a recipient who has
lined up a living donor, but who isn’t biologically compatible. In turn, that donor’s kidney
can benefit other patients who have also lined up living donors who ended up being
incompatible, each time passing an extra kidney down the line.”
Many people think it is not appropriate to buy and sell organs, and fear that arbitrary
donations might foster payments under the table. Under this repugnance constraint,
which of the above organ donation system would you choose to maximize efficiency?
Which of the following statements are true?
Giffen goods, when they exist, always have a downward sloping Engel curves.
Consumer surplus is always zero with a perfect elastic demand curve.
Suppose Joe’s Labor supply decrease when the hourly wage rate increases, then
leisure is a normal goods for Joe.
A person who is risk averse at all levels of income would never buy a share in a
company which offered an uncertain return.
A farmer is risk-averse and has utility given by U(m) = log(m) where m is money
income. He can grow potatoes or wheat or both in his land. The crop of both products
is dependent on weather. If the weather is good, 1 acre of land yields a return of $260
if devoted to potatoes and of $150 if devoted to wheat. If the weather is bad, 1 acre of
potatoes yields $80 whereas an acre of wheat yields $120. Good and bad weather are
equally likely (probability = 0.5 ). The farmer has 100 acres of land. Then:
He should devote all his land to potatoes.
He should devote roughly 81.9 acre to potatoes.
Now consider the case that the farmer can buy outside insurance. This policy, for
every $1 that the farmer puts, pays out $2 if the weather is bad and nothing if the
weather is good. Then:The farmer would still devote some land to wheat.
The farmer should by a total of $9000 insurance
For player 1, U is weakly dominated by C.
For player 1, only C would survive iterated strict dominance.
For player 2, L would survive iterated strict dominance
(C, L) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Company A is the only company in the marked for stuffed animals. The demand for
their toys is P = 40 − 4Q . The marginal cost and average cost are constant at $8.
The equilibrium price and output for the monopoly would be P = 24 and Q = 6 .
Now another company B, whose marginal and average cost are both constant at 16, is
also considering entering the market. Let qB be the amount produced for B.
If company A still sticks onto its amount of production at monopoly, the residual
demand company B faces would be P = 24 − 4qB .
If A sticks onto its amount of production at monopoly, and B follow the Cournot
assumption, then company B would produce 2 to maximize profit.
If both companies follow the Stackelberg assumption, where A is the leader, then
the equilibrium quantity produced for A and B would be 4 and 1 respectively.
Regarding to the Theory of Discrimination, which of the following statements are
true?
If blacks are paid less than their marginal product, then non-discriminating firms
will hire more blacks.
If blacks are paid less than their marginal product, then employers can engage in
discrimination at zero cost.
If white employees dislike associating with black employees, then blacks will be
paid a lower wage than whites.
If white employees dislike associating with black employees, then the workforce
will be heavily segregated.
Which of the following matches between the Nobel Prize winners and the major
contributions for them to win the prize are correct?
Steve Levitt-Freakonomics
Gary Becker-Human Capital
Michael Spencer-Signal Theory
Joseph Stiglitz-Globalization and its Discontent
James Heckman-Self Selection Bias
Paul Krugman-Economic Geography
Which of the following statements are true?
Both monopolies and externalities lead to inefficient allocation of resources.
Therefore, a firm that is both a monopoly and a source of negative externalities is
an especially serious social problem.
Government intervention is the only way to solve the externality problem.
Consider a demand curve for reckless driving, for which the “price of reckless
driving” is interpreted as the probability of having a fatal accident. In this case,
safer cars will increase the total number of driver fatalities.
If average cost decrease in quantity, then the production function must be
increasing return to scale.
If the production function is increasing return to scale, then average cost decreases
in quantity.
單親媽媽阿虹每週有40 小時可以分配在上網休閒和去麥當勞打工(時薪為100 元)
上。假設她的效用函數U(L,M)為平滑且凸向原點: (10%)
(a) 作圖說明當政府對單親媽媽給予每週500 元的社會救助時,會對阿虹的勞動供給
產生什麼影響?請同時考慮(1)是否參與勞動市場,和(2)若已參與,最適工時如何
變動兩個面向。 (2%)
(b) 現在新上任政府改用另外一種政策:針對阿虹每週工資所得在1,000 元以下的部
分,她每多賺一元,政府就補貼0.5 元;每週工資所得在1,000 至3,000 元的部分,
政府則不予補助(但是她還是可以留著1,000 元以下工資所得到的補貼);然而在
超過3,000 元的部分,阿虹每賺一元,政府就抽走a%:
(b-1) 若政府希望當阿虹工作40 小時的時候,此一政策對她沒有影響(i.e.此時不
補貼也不課稅),請求a 之值,並畫出阿虹的預算限制式。 (3%)
(b-2) 說明此一新政策會對阿虹的勞動供給產生什麼影響?一樣請同時考慮(1)是
否參與勞動市場,和(2)若要參與,最適工時為何兩個面向。(hint:阿虹原來
的最適選擇為何會影響討論的結果)。 (5%)
可觀看題目詳解,並提供模擬測驗!(免費會員無法觀看研究所試題解答)