要素k 之價格為$16,要素l 之價格為$1。兩種要素皆為變動要素。甲
以最小的成本生產,當y = 10,甲最適的要素使用量k 與l 為何?
K = 100
K = 400
l = 100
l = 400
以上皆非
令AC(y)與MC(y)為甲全產y 單位的平均成本與邊際成本。
AC(y) = 4y
AC(y) = 8y
MC(y) = 4y
MC(y) = 8y
MC(y) = 16y
令AC(y)與MC(y)為甲全產y 單位的平均成本與邊際成本。
產品y 的市場為完全競爭,產品y 之價格為$100。甲追求利潤極大,
請問他會生產幾單位的y?
20
25
30
35
以上皆非
c、b 生產x、y 兩物,c 工作1 天的生產可能線為:x + y = 20, d 工作1 天的生產
可能線為:2x + y = 30,
c 有生產x 的比較利益(comparative advantage)
c 有生產y 的比較利益
d 有生產x 的比較利益
d 有生產y 的比較利益
以上皆非
c、b 生產x、y 兩物,c 工作1 天的生產可能線為:x + y = 20, d 工作1 天的生產
可能線為:2x + y = 30,
c、d 兩人合作生產,1 天兩人總共生產15 單位的x,且在此前提之下,
尋求y 總產量之極大。請問這15 單位的x 該如何生產?
c 生產15 單位的x
d 生產15 單位的x
c 生產10 單位的x, d 生產5 單位的x
c 生產5 單位的x, d 生產10 單位的x
以上皆非
美國聯邦準備銀行 (Federal Reserve)如何應對次級房貸(sub-prime mortgage)的問
題?其對於美國政府公債價格之影響為何?
美國聯邦準備銀行降息
美國聯邦準備銀行升息
美國政府公債價格上升
美國政府公債價格下降
美國政府公債價格不變
Hillary and Barack are playing a game. Hillary offers to place a bet on the outcome of
the game at fair odds. Barack is risk-averse and believes that he has a 60% chance of
winning the game.
Barack will always accept the bet.
Barack will accept the bet if the amount of the bet is large enough.
Barack will accept the bet if the amount of the bet is small enough.
Barack will never accept the bet.
None of the above.
Suppose there are two types of labors: skilled labor and unskilled labor. A person
cannot change from unskilled labor to skilled labor and vice versa. The slopes of the
supply curves for both types of labors are positive and finite. These two types of labors
are assumed to be substitutes in production. The government in Taiwan increased the
minimal wage rate from NT$66 per hour to NT$95 per hour on July 1, 2007 and the
law applies to both types of labors and is strictly enforced. Before the policy change,
the equilibrium wages for skilled and unskilled labors were NT$120 and NT$80,
respectively.
The quantity of employed unskilled labor must have declined after the policy
change.
The quantity of employed skilled labor must have declined after the policy change.
The wage rate of skilled labor must have increased after the policy change.
The demand for unskilled labor must have shifted downward after the policy
change.
None of the above.
Suppose the demand for gasoline is D(p) = 120 − p. There is a monopolistic firm
operating in this market. Its total cost function of producing q units is TC(q) = 10+ 2q2 .
The production of gasoline pollutes the air in the surrounding area. The cost of the
damage is q2 when q units of gasoline are produced. Assume that people living in the
surrounding area do not consume gasoline. The objective of the firm is to maximize its
own profit. Price discrimination is infeasible in this market. Assume that the only
method to reduce pollution is by changing the quantity of gasoline production.
When the victims of the pollution cannot negotiate with the firm, the firm set the
gasoline price at p = 100.
If the firm has the property right to make pollution and it is costless for the
pollution victims to negotiate with the firm to reduce pollution, the price of gasoline
will be p = 105.
If the people living in the surrounding area have the property right of clean air and
it is costless for them to negotiate with the firm, the price of gasoline will be p =
110.
If the victims of the pollution cannot negotiate with the firm, the government can
increase the social gain by subsidize the firm $5 per unit of gasoline production.
None of the above.
Suppose X is an industry of monopolistic competition. All firms face a downwardsloping
demand curve. Firms can enter or exit the industry in the long run.
In the short run equilibrium, a firm may earn positive profit in this industry.
In the short run equilibrium, a firm may earn negative profit in this industry.
In the long run equilibrium, all firm must earn zero profit in this industry.
In the long run equilibrium, a firm’s average cost at its output level must be greater
than its marginal cost at its output level.
None of the above.
You are the owner of a monopolist. Currently, you choose a single price to maximize
your-profit. Your production causes neither external costs nor external benefits.
Your choice of the price is higher than the socially optimal level.
The deadweight loss may decline if the taxpayers subsidize you NT$100 per unit of
output.
If you can use first degree price discrimination, the deadweight loss must decline.
If you are required by the government to earn zero profit, the output level must be
lower than the socially optimal level.
None of the above.
Suppose Alice is impatient. Plot her indifference curves on a graph with current
consumption on the horizontal axis and future consumption on the vertical axis.
Impatience implies her indifference curves must be convex.
Her indifference curves may be straight lines.
Her indifference curves must have absolute slopes greater than one along the 45°
line.
Her indifference curves depend on her endowment.
None of the above.
Suppose that both current consumption and future consumption are normal good for all
consumers.
If everyone expects global warming will reduce future supply but not current supply,
the demand for current consumption must decline.
If everyone expects global warming will reduce future supply but not current supply,
the real interest rate must decrease.
If everyone expects the recent storm will decrease current supply but have no effect
on future supply, the demand for current consumption must decline.
If everyone expects the recent storm will decrease current supply but have no effect
on future supply, the real interest rate may either go up or down.
None of the above.
Consider an industry of an homogeneous good. All firms take rivals’ outputs as given
and make their own output decisions simultaneously. The demand for the good is
downward-sloping. Originally, there were three firms (A, B, and C) with identical
constant marginal cost in the industry. No other firm can enter this industry because of
government regulation. One day, Firm A and Firm B found that it would be profitable if
they could merge together. Consequently, they become a merged firm, called “AB”.
There are only two firms (AB and C) remaining in the industry after the merger.
Suppose that the merger may reduce the marginal cost of Firm AB because of
economics of scale, but it is also possible that the marginal cost is unchanged. Because
we do not observe the cost data, we are not sure whether the marginal cost have
declined after the merger.
If the price of the good decreased after the merger, the merger must have reduced
the marginal cost of the merged firm AB.
If the price of the good decreased after the merger, the social gain must have
become higher.
If the merger decreased the marginal cost, consumers must be better off.
The profit of Firm C must have increased after the merger.
None of the above.
.
The optimal number of passengers on the bus is 25.
If the university decides to charge $20 for a ride, the number of passengers on the
bus is less than the socially optimal level.
Social gain must increase if the university decides to charge a positive price.
None of the above.
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