Which of the following can best describe Honhai's business model?
OEM (original equipment manufacturing)
ODM (original design manufacturing)
OBM (original brand manufacturing)
EMS (Electronics manufacturing services)
Which of the following capability does Honhai need in order to implement this
business model?
time-to-market
time-to-volume
inventory flexibility
engineering and manufacturing services.
Since 2002, Honhai has doubled its revenue once two years. What would be its key
mechanism/s to drive growth?
branding
patenting
cost down
vertical integration.
Honhai's relocation to China is primarily based on the consideration of?
market sales
labor supply and costs
land supply and costs
access to knowledge and technology.
To build a manufacturing empire in China, what kind/s of strategy would be involved?
building production bases at multiple locations
establishing marketing channels
financing at multiple stock markets
labor recruitment.
In order to link R&D centers, logistics hub and production bases all over China, what
kind/s of tool would be deployed?
TQM (total quality management)
CAD/CAM
information system
human resource management.
Terry is sometimes called Genghis Khan (成吉思汗) by the media. Which of the
following can best describe Honhai's corporate culture?
bureaucratic
democratic
authoritarian
meritocratic (菁英領導)
According to your understanding on Honhai, which of the following management
features of Genghis Khan can be also found in Honhai?
profit sharing
eliminate office politics
embrace change
think ahead
As Honhai's scale and scope keep on expanding, what kind/s of challenge will Terry
have to face?
construction of plants and assembly lines
sustainability of corporate culture
financial management
labor recruitment and training
Honhai just went public at Hong Kong stock market as FIH (Foxconn International
Holding). What would be its primary consideration/s?
evade taxes
evade Taiwan's restrictions on investment in China
leverage international capital
distribute risks among financial markets
The reasons why Honhai didn't follow Huawei's move are because of their differences in
corporate image
nationality
connections to China's central government
business model.
What kind/s of impact will possible hit Honhai after the implementation of the Labor
Contract Law?
labor lawsuit
labor cost
governmental corruption
order lost.
Why did Terry adopt an aggressive strategy to comply with the Labor Contract Law?
forced by China's central government
preempt possible lawsuits
improve corporate image
restructure incentive system
If Terry wants to relocate some of Honhai's production or functions to Vietnam, which
of the following will be the first to be considered?
components with short life cycles
components or assembly requires skilled labor
logistics
non-volatile components or low-end assembly.
What problem/s will Honhai probably encounter in the initial stage of relocating from
China to Vietnam?
labor shortage
institutional barriers
language and cultural barriers
inadequate infrastructure.
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
TSMC introduced a new business model in the semiconductor industry, which is called
IDM (integrated device manufacturing)
foundry
design house
specialized supplier
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
The core competency of this new business model is primarily based on the capability of
providing
design service
mask service
wafer fabrication service
assembly and test service.
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
What are the forces driving the growth of wafer size?
decreasing unit cost of chip fabrication
Moore's law
increasing entry barrier
scale economies for automation
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
Moore's Law describes an important trend of IC: the number of transistors that can be
inexpensively placed on an IC is doubling approximately every 18 months. What was
this law really about when Gordon Moore published it in 1965?
an observation from the history
a forecast about the future
a goal for the entire industry
a prophecy deemed to be fulfilled
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
How did this law affect the development of semiconductor industry in general?
shorten time-to-market
increase transistor density
increase development costs
accelerate globalization of production and marketing.
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
How did this law affect the development of TSMC in particular?
relocate 12-inch plant to China
upgrade lithography technology towards nano-scale
increase wafer size
increase the complexity of fabrication processes
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
If continue following this law, what challenge/s will the semiconductor industry face in
the future?
shortage of raw material
complexity in design and engineering
physical limit of lithography
replacement of substitute products.
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
According to Porter's five-force analysis, how will the investment in packaging
increase TSMC's competitiveness?
raise entry barriers
strengthen TSMC's current position
increase bargaining power vs. suppliers
increase bargaining power vs. customers
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
What else would TSMC possibly do to increase its competitiveness?
recruit more talent
invest in design
integrate activities along the value chain
raise more capital from the stock market/s.
【涂志豪/台北報導】 工商時報2007.11.06
晶圓代工龍頭台積電轉投資材料科技昨日宣佈,為了與台積電及采鈺間針對12
吋晶圓製造及晶圓級封裝進行合作,精材位於竹科三廠的12 吋晶圓級封裝生產線,
已完成了裝機作業,預計明年首季開始量產。……台積電今年對後段封測的投資及著
墨愈深,已吸引國內外封測廠及其它晶圓代工廠注意。……台積電總執行長蔡力行在
日前台積電運動會時就指出,台積電原本就有提供包括晶圓植凸塊(Wafer Bumping)、
晶圓級測試(Wafer Sorting)、及CMOS 感測器封測及模組等封測業務,目的不是要與
封測廠競爭,而是要提高台積電的附加價值,因為系統單晶片(SOC)及系統級封裝(SiP)
都是未來有發展前景的市場。對台積電來說,與轉投資公司共同提供封測服務,不會
對營運及技術自我設限,如此一來才能繼續提高本身的附加價值。……精材科技成立
於1998 年9 月,目前最大股東為台積電,董事長為前台積電副總蔣尚義,執行長為
林俊吉,現在員工人數約1300 人,主要業務為提供半導體影像感測元件、與各類型
IC 產品之高階晶圓級封裝等相關生產代工服務。
TSMC's control over 精材科技 is primarily based on the use of
ownership
operation right
stock share
the appointment of high-ranking officers.
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
Which of the following can best explain Noika's moves in the last quarter of 2007 and
in the near future?
Strengthen one's own current position
Grab an unoccupied position
De-position or re-position
Employ exclusive club or product ladders
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
iPone's pricing in Europe is primarily based on the consideration of
cost
competition
customers' perceived value
target demand.
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
The way Nokia is doing to defend its Europe market is best called:
contraction defense
counteroffensive defense
preemptive defense
flank defense
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
iPhone's intrusion in Europe can be characterized by which of the following specific
attack strategy?
product proliferation
encirclement attack
market concentration
product innovation
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
3G phone users who are fascinated with the video telephony are pursuing which of the
following needs?
physiological need
safety need
social need
esteem need.
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
Motorola is the 2nd largest mobile phone supplier globally. According to the above
article, what is Motorola's relative market share in global mobile phone market?
Between 20% and 29%
Between 10% and 19%
about 1/ 2
about 1/ 3 .
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
Let all mobile phone suppliers in global market be entries of a BCG matrix. Nokia has
been the leader and Motorola has been 2nd player in 2006 and 2007. Let circle size
represent the sales volume. Assume that from 2006 to 2007, Nokia moves vertically
upward with enlarging circle on the BCG matrix. Which of the following is the best
description of Motorola from 2006 to 2007 on the BCG matrix?
Motorola's sales volume is increased
Motorola's market share is increased
Motorola may move vertically upward or vertically downward on BCG
Motorola may move horizontally left or horizontally right on BCG
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
As Rogers's senior vice president in strategy who studies The Art of War by Sun Tzu
very well, you point out than Nokia's strategy can be best described as:
故知兵書,動而不迷,舉而不窮。故曰:知己知彼,勝乃不殆;知天知地,勝
乃可全。
夫地形者,兵之助也。料敵制勝,計險厄遠近,上將之道也。知此而用戰者必
勝;不知此而用戰者必敗。
凡戰者,以正合,以奇勝。故善出奇者,無窮如天地,不竭如江河。
故用兵之法,十則圍之,五則攻之,倍則分之。
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
In addition to disclosing Nokia's strategy, you are asked to propose iPhone's
competitive strategy in Europe. Which of the following is the best applicable strategy
to iPhone?
故明君賢將,所以動而勝人,成功出于眾者,先知也。
故善用兵者,譬如率然。率然者,常山之蛇也。擊其首則尾至,擊其尾則首至,
擊其中則首尾俱至。
出其所不趨,趨其所不意;行千里而不勞者,行于無人之地也。
用兵之法,無恃其不來,恃吾有以待也;無恃其不攻,恃吾有所不可攻也。
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
Consistent with the above answer, in order to identify iPhone's target market, Rogers is
supposed to consider to following information EXCEPT:
the market potential of mobile phones or smartphones
the underlying demands of potential mobile phone users
Motorola's competences
Nokia's core competences
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
What is the best advertising strategy for iPhone in Europe?
informative advertising
persuasive advertising
reminder advertising
reinforcement advertising.
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
The distribution channel of iPhone in UK is called
indirect channel
direct channel
multiple channel
hybrid channel
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
From Nokia's perspective, the partnership between Nokia and Universal Music can be
best described as
complementary alliance
competitive collaboration
vertical partnership
strategic cooperation.
In the morning of early December, 2007, Mark Rogers, general manager of Apple
Inc.'s UK division, was browsing the Wall Street Journal in his office in Apple's London
headquarter while preparing for a later meeting of market review. Apple just introduced its
iPhone (i.e., a phone with a multi-touch screen an iPod's features) in Europe on Nov. 9 by
the mobile phone operator, O2. The iPhone's introduction in US was quite remarkable. In
June, 2007, during the initial 36 hours of debut in US, 125 units were sold per minute. Even
though Apple took a firm stand in its first step in the mobile phone market, it didn't
necessarily mean Apple was able to do as well in its next step. In Europe, it was expected
that Apple would encounter more intensive competition. For example, since 3G (i.e., a
network facilitating faster internet surfing and audio-video synchronized transmission on
mobile phones) was not prevalent in US yet, iPhone, unlike its major rivals, lacked of 3G
support. Without higher-speed internet access via 3G, iPhone's many internet relevant
functions might disappoint Europe users. Besides, in UK, iPhone was sold, mainly due to
the tariff and specifically designed wireless service for the Europe market, at a premium
GBP 269 with an additional monthly service plan starting at GBP 35. On the contrary,
Nokia's (i.e., leader in Europe and worldwide market dominating almost double market
share of its closest competitor by the end of 2007) high-end music phones were free of
charge for customers paying similar monthly service.
A report on the WSJ regarding iPhone's top competitor, Nokia, caught Rogers's
attention. It reported that Nokia partnering with Universal Music (i.e., the largest music
company in the world) introduced a service called "Comes with Music" in December, 2007.
Through this service, customers were able to buy and download music via Nokia's handsets.
This service would make iPhone's function of music download less unique. Nokia was
looking for partnerships with other large music companies such that its music catalogs
could be enlarged. In addition to music access, Nokia kept exploring the new multimedia
services, such as games and GPS (global positioning system), for its mobile devices. It
seemed to Rogers that Nokia intended to defeat Apple's invasion face to face. In November
2007, Nokia opened a flagship store which was very close to Apple's own London store
exhibiting and selling iPhones. Nokia even employed the same architectural firm that had
worked on Apple's stores. Nokia hoped that its stylish store design and many similar
features would further compete with iPhone's stores. Nokia's new phones featuring
scrolling wheel also looked much like Apple's iPod. Rogers worried about what Apple
should do to respond to Nokia's moves.
Nokia keeps extending its multimedia services in order to
enhance credence qualities
increase competitive differentiation
establish product-feature specialist
take advantage of single-segment concentration.
Managers watch changes in technology closely because of their spillover effect. Which
of the following is NOT considered a technology spillover risk?
Employees
organizational structure
processes
resistance to change
Effective managers welcome some degree of ______ conflict because it ______.
affective; clarifies role ambiguity
cognitive; withers ineffective ideas on the vine
relationship; forces strong leaders to emerge
substantive; generates creative problem-solving
Which of the following motivation theories focuses PRIMARILY on the social nature
of motivation?
acquired needs theory
equity theory
expectancy theory
two-factor theory.
The normative decision-making model implies that the most important question
managers can ask when deciding how much subordinate participation to encourage
is ______ .
do subordinates have sufficient information to make high-quality decisions?
how important is the subordinate commitment to the decision?
how important is the quality of the decision?
is the problem well structured?
A mission statement articulates the fundamental purpose of the organization and often
contains ______ .
a value proposition
a company identity or self-concept
primary activities
all of the above.
In a declining industry
product differentiation efforts are focused on product refinement as a basis of
product differentiation
firms that are first movers can gain product differentiation advantages based on
perceived technological leadership
highly differentiated firms may be able to gain product differentiation advantages
by preempting strategically valuable assets
highly differentiated firms may be able to discover a viable market niche that will
enable them to survive despite the overall decline in the market.
Perceptual map is in general generated by
conjoint analysis
LISREL
Regression
multidimensional scaling
Companies good at launching new products often have culture that
encourages risk-taking and the open exchange of ideas.
an entrepreneurial
a centralized
a marketing oriented
a collaborative.
Even though most people in the original target market for electric toothbrushes already
knew how to brush their teeth, consumers still had some learning to do in order to make
good use of the new brushing technique. The electric toothbrush is an example of
a ______ .
dynamically continuous innovation
discontinuous innovation
competitive innovation
moderate innovation.
General Mills has developed an experiential website called MyCereal.com. Visitors to
this site can mix their own cereal ingredients. By allowing customers to develop their
own cereal according to their desires, General Mills is making further implementation
of a(n) _______ .
full line strategy
marketing mix strategy
production differentiation strategy
competitive stretch strategy.
A skunk work is most closely related to .
a specialized form of brand extension
negotiations conducted before the introduction of a co-branded product
a venture team off-site location
marketing for products that are not branded
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